● The State, represented by the President’s Office, General Prosecutor’s Office, National Security Committee, Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, should provide a publicly available conclusion on the effectiveness of the use of internet blocking mechanisms and communications shutdown through the prism of the events of January 2022.
● The State, represented by the MDDIAI, National Security Committee, and mobile operators, should define and specify communications procedures, and also make official publications of all documented liaison (letters, inquires, notifications, and meeting minutes) between themselves that took place on the background of the events from early January 2022.
● Leave behind those provisions of the national legislation that envisage restrictions of access to the internet and practice of blocking web-resources and cutting down the internet. In case the user has no traffic or in case of technical failures, the State, represented by the MDDIAI of the RK and mobile operators, should define the list of the socially significant resources and services, whether governmental, private, and public, which should be available even in the absence of internet so to ensure the entire spectrum of the rights and interests of its population.
● Mobile operators should strengthen their transparency and improve the mechanism of informing their subscribers on any possible and actual blockages and disconnections, accompanied by the most detailed clarifications and justifications, through their own communications channels (push notification services, news, short messages), placement of announcements at the official pages in social networks – preferably in the form of publications, and not as comments/quickly disappearing stories or other less vivid methods – and also through mass media sources.
● All stakeholders should expand information coverage campaigns on the protection of the right to access to the internet, and also on the implementation of the right to privacy in light of possible leakages of personal data, correspondence and other private information from the devices, when trusting unverified technical solutions in the form of widely spread programs and applications with various spheres of their intended usage.
● Telegram users are recommended to clean up the list of proxy-servers and keep only mostly trustworthy and recommended by cyber security specialists and relevant organizations.